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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
VICTOR VIALPANDO, : 
Case No. 20020405-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : Priority No. 2. 
SUMMARY 
On appeal Mr. Vialpando is challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to 
suppress and the inclusion of jury instructions that do not reflect the proper standard for 
driving under the influence of alcohol. Mr. Vialpando maintains that the trial court erred 
in concluding both that the officer's stop and seizure of him was valid under the Fourth 
Amendment and that the intoxilyzer results were reliable and thus admissible. Mr. 
Vialpando also maintains that the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury regarding 
the elements of actual physical control in a criminal case. 
In response to Mr. Vialpando's arguments on appeal, the state claims that Mr. 
Vialpando was validly stopped and seized based on the totality of the officer's 
observations. The state further argues that the trial court properly admitted the intoxilyzer 
results at trial and that such results were reliable. Finally, the state asserts that the trial 
court properly instructed the jury regarding actual physical control. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TROOPER LACKED REASONABLE, ARTICULABLE SUSPICION 
TO STOP MR. VIALPANDO 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized three levels of police encounters with the 
public which are constitutionally permissible: 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and pose questions so 
long as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize 
a person if the officer has an "articulable suspicion" that the person has 
committed or is about to commit a crime; however, the "detention must be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of 
the stop"; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable 
cause to believe an offense has been committed or is being committed. 
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (quoting United States v. Merritt 
736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir.1984) (citation omitted)). It is without question that the 
trooper's stop of Mr. Vialpando qualifies as a level II encounter. 
The state argues that because the trooper was concerned with the woman's safety, 
the stop of Mr. Vialpando was justified and the trooper's suspicion did not dissipate when 
the woman was no longer in the vicinity. The state argues that once an officer observes 
activity which give rise to suspicion of criminal activity, the officer may stop and briefly 
detain an individual to investigate. However, in this instance, the state fails to distinguish 
between future potential criminal activity and actual criminal activity. 
The trooper testified that he "figured, you know, this — this probably isn't — this 
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isn't right, something's going on here. I hit my siren to— to stop him from chasing her 
and turned around as soon as I could." (Mot. Hrg. Tr. 4.) The only reason the trooper 
gave for turning around was "to make sure she [the woman] was going to be all right." 
(Mot. Hrg. Tr. 4.) At that time, the trooper believed that some type of criminal offense 
involving the woman could occur. (Mot. Hrg. Tr. 4.) The trooper never testified that he 
believed a crime had been committed against the woman. His only concern was with her 
welfare, but despite this concern, the trooper never once attempted to find the woman. 
(Mot. Hrg. Tr. 12-14.) 
In its argument, the state attempts to create reasonable suspicion based on facts 
that were never elicited at the hearing. The state argues that given the totality of the 
circumstances, the trooper had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe that a crime 
had been or was about to be committed. (App. Br. 9.) Specifically, the state asks this 
Court to consider the following "facts": "the woman ran across a public street in an 
apparent attempt to escape from the defendant" and "it appeared that the two were in 
some type of an altercation because the trooper heard yelling." (App. Br. 9.) Neither of 
these statements involving the woman's "escape" or a suspected altercation were ever 
elicited from the trooper at the motion hearing. In fact, the trooper testified that when he 
observed the man chasing the woman, he believed something was "not right", and turned 
his vehicle around to make sure that the woman was okay. (Mot. Hrg. Tr. 4.) The 
trooper testified that he wanted Mr. Vialpando to stop because "I wanted to question him 
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about chasing the girl across the street." (Motion Hrg. Tr. 5.) Upon discovering that the 
woman was no longer with Vialpando, or anywhere to be found, the trooper's suspicion 
that a criminal offense involving the woman might occur in the future was dispelled. 
A level II encounter permits a police officer to temporarily detain an individual 
based on a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the individual has committed or is about 
to commit a crime. However, the detention must last no longer than is necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop. See Deitman, 739 P.2d at 617-18, quoting Merritt, 736 
F.2d at 230 (citation omitted). Here, because the trooper testified that he was concerned 
about the woman's welfare and that she may be the victim of a future crime, her absence 
from Mr. Vialpando's presence dispelled that suspicion. There was no reason for the 
trooper to continue the stop or to question Mr. Vialpando at that point. Accordingly, the 
trooper lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to detain Mr. Vialpando. Mr. Vialpando 
asks this Court to reverse the trial court's finding of reasonable suspicion and remand this 
case for further proceedings. 
II THE INTOXILYZER RESULTS LACKED A PROPER FOUNDATION 
AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED 
The state asserts that because the trooper observed Mr. Vialpando for 15 minutes 
before administering the Intoxilyzer 5000 test, the trial court properly admitted the test 
results into evidence. (App. Br. 11.) Specifically, the state argues that the trooper's pre-
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testing observation of Mr. Vialpando was sufficient to ensure that the test results were not 
compromised by vomiting, belching, or the introduction of alcohol into Mr. Vialpando's 
mouth prior to the administration of the intoxilyzer test. 
It is without dispute that prior to admitting the results of the intoxilyzer test, an 
officer must observe the test subject for fifteen minutes prior to the administration of the 
test. (App. Br. 11: State v. Baker. 56 Wash.2d 846, 355 P.2d 806, 811 (1960), cited with 
approval in Salt Lake Citv v. Womack. 747 P.2d 1039, 1041 (1987).) The purpose of the 
observation period is to ensure no substance is introduced into the test subject's mouth 
that would affect the reliability of the test results. (Mot. Hrg. Tr. 15; Womack, 747 P.2d 
at 1041 n.2 ("[A] foreign substance present in the mouth which might produce an 
artificially high result will be removed by absorption during the observation period.1').) A 
failure to comply with this requirement renders the test results inadmissible as lacking 
foundation. See Baker, 355 P.2d at 811; State v. Carson, 988 P.2d 225 (Idaho App. 
1999)(holding that state's failure to demonstrate officer's compliance with fifteen minute 
observation period prior to administration of Intoxilyzer 5000 test renders the results 
excludable as lacking foundation). 
Here, the state argues that defense counsel bore the burden of demonstrating that 
the trooper did not comply with the 15 minute observation period at the motion hearing. 
(App. Br. 12.) In fact, a defendant shoulders no such burden as the 15 minute observation 
period is a foundational requirement that the state must meet before the test results are 
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admitted. See Baker, 355 P.2d at 810. 
To meet this foundational requirement, the state must demonstrate that "the level 
of surveillance must be such as could reasonably be expected to accomplish the purpose 
of the requirement." Carson, 988 P.2d at 227. The state argues that this reasonableness 
requirement is not necessary as it is a standard that has not been adopted by the Utah 
Department of Public Safety. If accepted, the state's position renders the 15 minute 
observation period requirement a nullity, elevating form over substance, and ignores this 
Court's prior assertion that "a foreign substance present in the mouth which might 
produce an artificially high result will be removed by absorption during the observation 
period." Womack, 747 P.2d at 1041 n.2. The Carson court's explanation of the level of 
observation necessary to show compliance with the 15 minute period of observation 
appropriately addresses the intent of the requirement: to ensure that any foreign substance 
in the mouth of a test subject which might produce an artificially high result will be 
removed by absorption during the observation period. 
Here, the trooper testified that he began the 15 minute observation period while in 
his patrol car. Mr. Vialpando was in the front seat of the patrol car and the trooper was 
driving on the freeway at a late hour. The trooper was required to drive, observe all 
traffic laws, and observe Mr. Vialpando both through his peripheral vision and 
6 
;n , 
I he trooper testified thai a^  he was dri ving Mr. Vialpando to the testing center ^** 
1md his attention diverted to other things, such as dn\ HIL . ... 
him as well." (Mot. i irg ' ao a^keu UK, 
mat he could vomit. (Mot. 1 Irg. lr. 10.) 
1 lin rafter, the trooper testified that he checked Mr. Vialpando's mouth for any foreign 
substances and began the 15 minute observation period. (Mot. Hrg. .: - ) 
Upon arriving at the testing center and pno: .i J .a , . . <i r 
did not ukvK .... . ^;ij;ai:u i .adieu oi vomited 
auci i l * ilnando vomited once more, sliorih aiua UK- ^st 
was administered, while he was being driven from the testing center to the Salt Lake 
County jail (Mot. Hrg. Tr. 24.) 
Assuming the Carson court's standard is appiu 
trooper . ie . . * ^ • been reasonably likely to 
0 ' : • ? Mi. vialpando that would compromise the test results. (Apr B 
i /.; x u reach ih:b conclusion, this Court niusi asMimi Msar sufficient observation of a test 
subject is permissible and possible ^lui^ i..e ^r^.-vi .;: ... . 
Mi. Vialpando objects to any references by the state in its brief to portions ot the 
\avy trial transcript. T!K. trial court's decision to admit the Intoxilyzer 5000 results was 
based on the testimony elicited at the motion hearing only. Accordingly, the defense asks 
the court to disregard any references the state makes to the trial fraiiscript and to limit its 
review to the motion hearing transcript. See Apr P r n t l/1- •!"" 
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speeds. Moreover, this Court must find it unnecessary for an officer to check a test 
subject's mouth or inquire whether the test subject has belched, vomited or otherwise 
introduced any foreign substance into his or her mouth prior to the administration of the 
test. Certainly when a test subject has recently vomited and there is no question that a 
foreign substance has been introduced into his or her mouth, it is reasonable to expect 
such inspection and inquiries prior to the administration of the test to ensure the reliability 
of the results. Under these circumstances, in the absence of reasonable observation, a 
visual inspection and verbal queries, there is no assurance that the test results are reliable. 
Absent prima facie evidence that these foundational requirements were met, the trial 
court erred in admitting the results of the Intoxilyzer 5000. 
Ill THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS FAILED TO ACCURATELY 
INSTRUCT THE JURY REGARDING ACTUAL PHYSICAL 
CONTROL 
The state contends that the trial court's instructions provided the jury with the 
proper definition of actual physical control. The state further argues that this Court 
should not address Mr. Vialpando's argument regarding instruction number five, which 
informed the jury that a defendant's subjective intent not to drive will not preclude a 
finding of actual physical control, because the instruction was not specifically objected to. 
As the state points out, in order to obtain appellate review, some specific preservation of 
claims of error must occur at the trial court level. See State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 
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1141 (1 Ital l 1989); \ pp Bi 18 1 Iere. defense counsel objected to instruction number 
eight, arguing that the instruction failed to properly instruct the jury of the appropriate 
standard for dri\ ing under tlu Influence of alcohol in a criminal case, and that the 
standard given to the jury was apj. * ^  a : , . . . , , , . . . . . . .) 
I >eIeiisc v HUM I I It ,ii I >h|t't l.'il I'Mhi III ill iii. li. HI I I in1 11. u \ 11uteh ivfkvt the U \ J >>l 
proof and 1 lie standards necessary to find guilt in a criminal case involving actual physical 
control in the context of a driving under the influence charge. (Trial Ti °; -§? ' T Tiule! 
these circumstances, because the objection was broad and generally challenged the .i ,.:• 
court's instructions regarding the appropriate * .!. . t 
si leu lid coi isidei I" li t : ' ialpandc "s cl lallen1 
I he state asserts that because the trial court luted its actual physical control 
instructions from existing Court of Appeals' opinions, the trial court properly advised the 
jury of the appropriate standards to follow i. i u \.i m ihiui . ^ \yy> ...
 S.J 
state's claim iu.4\:u .,:•* e .v,.. -
regardii ig acti lal ph\ sical coi iti: ol dc > i lot adhere to the standards pronounced by the Utah 
Supreme Court in State v. Bugger, 483 IMd 4--L: (\. :ah : >;";, 
Essentially, the state attempts to frame this issue as an attempt ; M. \ uupaiuhi to 
in I use an intent requirement into .... , . . . .^ :uag<. * i 
.: • ^ '• iui the case. Rather, 
Mr. Vialpando asks this Court to provide a definition of actual physical control which 
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conforms to the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Bugger, instead of citing to the 
definition of actual physical control contained in opinions evaluating the validity of 
revoking an individual's driver's license in a civil proceeding. 
The state further argues that there is no intent to drive requirement set forth in the 
Bugger decision, either explicitly or implicitly. Moreover, the state claims that 
subsequent Utah Supreme Court decisions clarify that the intent to drive is not a 
component of actual physical control. (App. Br. 21.) To reach this conclusion, the state 
again relies on standards set forth in civil cases involving the review of an administrative 
decision to revoke or suspend an individual's driving privilege rather than criminal cases 
involving actual physical control. (App. Br. 20-23; Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 
778, 780-81 (Utah 1986) (driver's license revocation proceeding requires only proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence); Garcia v Schwendiman, 645 P.2d at 655 (driver's license 
revocation proceeding)). This is precisely the error Mr. Vialpando raises on appeal: civil 
standards involving actual physical control have been inappropriately imputed to criminal 
matters. 
In defining the phrase "actual physical control", a driving under the influence of 
alcohol case, the Bugger Court provided a number of examples where actual physical 
control may be shown beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) a defendant in the driver's seat of a 
vehicle on the traveled portion of a highway with the motor running; (2) a defendant 
attempting to steer a vehicle while it is in motion; or (3) a defendant attempting to brake a 
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v t'l'tit'l'i' lid stop ih, movement I^uggcr. 483 P.2d at 443. Each ofihese scenarios set lorih 
by die Bugger Court require proof of an affirmative action or :u^v\ mi ihc part of a 
vehicle occupant to operate or drive a n lotor vehicle 
Moreoxei. i:. -. -\ m.. i. - u-ir .;;;,..
 m i iv ^ ;v.. .:-..*... • .*.: < . 
I Kp.ii in t i i i pi l" lil Salrt \ i• *• impose > Intu' i i Miil;i|f| lm <li'inoi» . in l ine actual 
pi lysical control in a driver's license revocation proceeding than would be required in a 
criminal driving under the influence of alcohol proceeding. In the state of Utah dn\ ing 
is considered to be a privilege and not a right. Moran v. Shaw. ?£*> I ..,. . . . „ »__ o 
•'I :J , " M. supercede .:>._, 
r e q : - -i. .• ..• - ! : ^ " id l i w o u l d dttcn.ll i l 
driving was deemed to be a right protected by the Constitution. ^ addition, it i- often the 
case that public safety concerns outweigh the driving privilege, thereby permitting the 
employment of a lower standard in revocation proceedings. See, e.g., Moran. - * • 
w hei i ai i ii idi v idi lal is cc :t I < > icte :1 of any ' drug -related offense, including possession of drug 
paraphernalia or marijuana, even though the offense has no connection to the operation of 
or the occupation of a motor vehicle). For example, an individual who is com iua i o: 
possessing drugparapl: lernalia ii I v i :»la;tioi I of I Ital I Code \ iii i § 58-37a- 5 oi possessic \ I :)i 
a i i !,ai ijuana , class B misdemeai lors i.1 i i > iolatioi I of I Jtah Code Ann. § 5 8-37-8^2){c), is 
automatical^ subject to a mandatory six month driver's license suspension. Ii matters not 
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that the offense of the possession of marijuana or drug paraphernalia occurs while the 
individual is walking down the street, riding as a passenger in a vehicle, or operating a 
vehicle. See Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-220. This policy reflects the intention of the Utah 
Legislature and the Department of Public Safety to regulate potential threats to public 
safety rather than actual threats. If actual threats to public safety were the only bases for 
revoking or suspending the driving privilege, then the mere possession of drug 
paraphernalia while walking down the sidewalk would not result in mandatory license 
suspension. 
Considering these factors, it is clear that the standard for revoking or suspending 
an individual's driving privilege requires a nominal level of proof which is much different 
than the level of proof needed to demonstrate the commission of a crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Under these circumstances, the standard for revoking or suspending an 
individual's driving privilege should not be the benchmark for proving the commission of 
a criminal offense. Because the jury in this case was instructed as to the civil standard for 
actual physical control rather than the standard set forth by the Bugger Court for criminal 
cases, this Court should reverse Mr. Vialpando's conviction and remand this case for a 
new trial with proper jury instructions. 
12 
CONCLUSION 
I ; or the reasons stated herein. Mr. Yialpando asks this Court to reverse his 
Lslon and remand this case for a new trial. 
s5£ SHANNON ROMl-RO 
Attorney for Defendant 
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